News & View, Volume 43 | Metallurgical Lab Featured Damage Mechanism- Failure of Dissimilar Metal Welds (DMW) in Steam-Cooled Boiler Tubes

News & Views, Volume 43 | Metallurgical Lab Featured Damage Mechanism: Failure of Dissimilar Metal Welds (DMW) in Steam-Cooled Boiler Tubes

By:  Wendy Weiss

News & View, Volume 43 | Metallurgical Lab Featured Damage Mechanism- Failure of Dissimilar Metal Welds (DMW) in Steam-Cooled Boiler TubesLarge utility-type steam generators inevitably contain a large number of pressure part welds that join components fabricated from different alloys.

Background
The welds made between austenitic stainless steel tubing and the lower-alloyed ferritic grades of tubing (T11, T22) deserve special mention because of the early failures that developed in some of these dissimilar metal welds (DMWs) soon after their introduction in superheater and reheater assemblies.  Prior to the mid-1970s, many DMWs were fabricated either as standard fusion welds using an austenitic stainless filler metal, such as TP308, or as induction pressure welds, in which the tubes were fused directly to each other without the addition of filler metal.  Some of these welds failed after less than 40,000 hours of operation, with the earliest failures being associated with DMWs that operated “hot” in units that cycled heavily and were subjected to bending stresses during operation. 

After the mid-1970s, and in response to extensive research carried out by EPRI and other organizations, an increasing number of DMWs in superheater and reheater tubes were fabricated as fusion welds using nickel-based filler metals, such as the INCO A, INCO 82, INCO 182, etc.

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News & View, Volume 43 | Delivering the Nuclear Promise- 10 CFR 50.69 Alternative Treatments for Low Safety-Significant Components

News & Views, Volume 43 | Delivering the Nuclear Promise: 10 CFR 50.69 Alternative Treatments for Low Safety-Significant Components

By:  Terry Herrmann

News & View, Volume 43 | Delivering the Nuclear Promise- 10 CFR 50.69 Alternative Treatments for Low Safety-Significant ComponentsAs all of us who work with nuclear energy know the US nuclear industry is engaged in a multi-year effort to generate power more efficiently, economically and safely. A key goal includes a significant reduction in operating expenses. This initiative is termed “Delivering the Nuclear Promise” (DNP) and is supported by nuclear utilities, vendors such as Structural Integrity, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).

10CFR50.69’ Risk Informed Engineering Programs (RIEP) is a regulation that enhances safety and provides the potential for large cost savings. This regulation allows plant owners to place systems, structures and components (SSCs) into one of the four risk-informed safety class (RISC) categories as indicated in the graphic to the right.

Industry experience to date suggests that 75 percent of safety-related SSCs can be categorized as RISC-3, low safety-significant (LSS), based on low risk. This is important because (a) it provides a focus on safety significance and (b) RISC-3 SSCs are exempted from “special treatment” requirements imposed by 10CFR50 Appendix B and other regulatory requirements (shown in the boxes at the bottom of page).

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